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Abstract 
Does state history matter for contemporary income distribution? Employing data for up to 
153 countries, this paper examines the extent to which accumulated statehood experience, 
obtained over six millennia, affects the current level of income inequality. To capture the 
historical depth of experience with state-level institutions, I use an extended measure of state 
history, constructed from 3500BCE to 2000CE. The results indicate that the relationship 
between state history and income inequality exhibits a U-shaped pattern. Specifically, 
statehood experience up to a point helps reduce income inequality. Nevertheless, an 
excessive duration of state history is conducive to more unequal income distribution. These 
findings are largely robust to performing a battery of sensitivity tests. 
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The conventional wisdom of development economics postulates that high and rising levels of 
income inequality are one of the most serious impediments to achieving sustainable economic 
development across the world (see, e.g., Persson & Tabellini, 1994; Easterly, 2007; Piketty, 
2014; Berg et al., 2018). Income inequality, in particular, may be associated with an unequal 
distribution of power and rent-seeking within a country (Bartels, 2009; Stiglitz, 2012). More 
recently, Berg et al. (2018) demonstrate that inequality lowers economic growth via reducing 
investments in human capital and increasing fertility. Furthermore, an unequal distribution of 
income is strongly correlated with crime, lower educational outcomes, the prevalence of mental 
illness, political instability, and social consensus, which ultimately hinder economic growth 
(Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Easterly, 2007; Pickett & Wilkinson, 2010; Berg et al., 2018). As 
illustrated in Figure 1, there exist striking variations in income inequality levels across 
countries, measured by the Gini coefficient of disposable income. For these reasons, it is 
important to investigate the drivers of income inequality. 
There are a large number of studies examining the determinants of income inequality, 
using cross-country data (see, e.g., Furceri & Ostry, 2019). The seminal article by Kuznets 
(1955), for instance, demonstrates that economic development at first induces higher income 
inequality but eventually lowers it. A recent study by Jauch and Watzka (2016) posits that 
financial development exerts a positive influence on the level of income inequality. In a similar 
vein, Haan and Sturm (2017) propose that income inequality is attributable to financial 
development, financial liberalization and banking crises. Furthermore, Furceri and Ostry 
(2019) provide a thorough and critical review of the development-inequality nexus. Using 
model-averaging methods, the authors suggest that the robust drivers of income inequality 
include demographic factors, income levels, and globalization.1 
A major challenge with drawing causal inference in this literature stems from 
endogeneity concerns. More specifically, economic development and financial development, 
for example, may affect the extent to which a country can adopt an egalitarian distribution of 
income, but reverse causation potentially exists, making it difficult to obtain valid statistical 
                                                             
1 These factors have been regarded as key determinants of income inequality across the world in many studies 
(see, e.g., Lam & Levison, 1992; Deaton & Paxson, 1997; Razin et al., 2002; Lee, 2014; Jauch & Watzka, 2016; 
Haan & Sturm, 2017). Gupta et al. (2002) argue that income inequality is more prevalent in countries with poor 




inference.2 Achieving causal interpretations, therefore, critically relies on identifying valid 
instrumental variables, which appears to be challenging. In this respect, Bazzi and Clemens 
(2013) reveal that the assumptions of instrument validity and relevance are commonly violated 
in growth regressions. These problems, if not accounted for, may yield a spurious relationship 
between economic performance and income inequality. From a conceptual perspective, if 
income inequality is induced by financial development, economic growth and globalization, a 
key question emerges as “What fundamentally drives the distribution of income?” It follows 
from this argument that these “proximate” determinants of inequality fail to explain the deep 
origins of income distribution, essentially because they are interrelated with and jointly 
determined by the level of income inequality. This necessitates examining the causes of income 
inequality from a deep or fundamental determinants approach.3  
Despite the above challenges of identification, the literature on the determinants of 
income inequality helps advance our understanding of factors affecting the distribution of 
income. This is essential for forming relevant policies to combat income inequality across 
countries. Nevertheless, one aspect that remains largely unexplored in previous studies is 
whether the formation and development of historical states, measured by an index of state 
history, matters for cross-country differences in income distribution. Therefore, the primary 
objective of the current study is to address this question through which it delivers a fresh 
perspective to the following lines of inquiries. 
First, this paper contributes to a large and emerging strand of research investigating the 
causes of income inequality (Furceri & Ostry, 2019). As reviewed earlier, a central focus of 
previous studies is the contemporary and proximate drivers of income distribution (e.g., 
economic growth, financial development, trade openness and demographic factors, to name 
just a few). Much less is known about the extent to which historical factors matter for today’s 
income distribution. Furthermore, it is useful to examine the relationship between history and 
income inequality because designing effective policies necessitates understanding the deep 
origins of a country’s income inequality. For this reason, this paper goes beyond the exisiting 
literature by exploring the effect of the early development of historical states on income 
inequality. Importantly, it is plausible that contemporary degrees of income inequality do not 
                                                             
2 Specifically, income inequality may impede economic development via reducing investments in human capital, 
population health and deterring social consensus (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Easterly, 2007; Berg et al., 2018). 
3 Specifically, the deep determinants literature attempts to investigate the fundamental causes of comparative 
development across countries, such as institutions, geography, genetic characteristics, statehood experience. See 
Owen (2017) for a review of related studies.  
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exert a direct infuence on the formation and development of historical states, dating back 
several thousands of years ago. This at least in part suggests that state history can provide 
plausibly exogneous sources of variation in present-day income inequality levels. 
Second, this study builds upon a number of studies arguing that the early development 
and formation of historical states lie at the roots of global income differences (e.g., Bockstette 
et al., 2002; Chanda & Putterman, 2007; Putterman & Weil, 2010; Hariri, 2012; Ang, 2013b, 
2013a; Borcan et al., 2018).4 In particular, Bockstette et al. (2002) construct a measure of state 
antiquity that captures the historical depth of experience with state-level institutions across 
countries. Using this indicator, the authors demonstrate that an early start confers a country 
with strong bureaucratic capabilities, which helps foster economic prosperity. Subsequent 
studies document a positive effect of state history on institutional quality and financial 
development (Ang, 2013b, 2013a). Therefore, the current research complements these studies 
by focusing on the role of state history in affecting income inequality. To my knowledge, this 
issue remains poorly understood in the long-run comparative development literature although 
the drivers of income inequality have been extensively examined in many studies. Later, I will 
control for income per capita, institutional quality, financial development, and other variables, 
which helps partial out the effect of state history on economic developmet. Even when I factor 
out these factors, statehood experience still exerts a statistically significant influence on today’s 
degrees of income inequality (Sections 2 and 5).   
Importantly, previous studies in this strand of literature have predominantly focused on 
a linear relationship between state history and economic performance. For this reason, they fail 
to explain why very old states such as Turkey, China and Iraq suffer from underdevelopment 
relative to those with an intermediate length of statehood experience like the UK, Japan and 
Denmark (Borcan et al., 2018).5 Using an extended measure of state history constructed by 
Borcan et al. (2018), this paper offers an explanation for this long-standing fact by documenting 
that the relationship between accumulated statehood experience across six millenia and income 
inequality follows a U-shaped pattern. In particular, the historical depth of experience with 
state-level institutions up to a point helps reduce income inequality. Nevertheless, countries 
                                                             
4 As explained earlier, these studies are broadly related to the deep determinants literature that explores the deep 
roots of global income differences (Owen, 2017).  
5 As far as I am aware,  Borcan et al. (2018) is the first and only study that documents a hump-shaped relationship 
between state antiquity and GDP per capita. This provides an explanation for income differences between very 
old states and those with an intermediate level of state history. The authors, in particular, argue that excessive 
state experience may be associated with an overcentralization of power, resulting in institutional stagnation and 
lagged productivity.  
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with an excessive duration of state experience also come at a cost of higher income inequality. 
These findings are robust to conducting a series of sensitivity tests. Overall, the results are 
consistent with Borcan et al. (2018) who show that state history has a hump-shaped effect on 
GDP per capita across countries rather than a linear relationship as previously established in 
the literature. By doing so, this paper lends additional support to the non-monotonic 
relationship between statehood experience and economic performance.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical framework 
explaining how statehood experience mattters for the distribution of income. Section 3 
discusses econometric methods and variables’ descriptions. The main findings are presented in 
Section 4. Section 5 discusses the results of robustness tests, and the last section conludes. 
2. The economic argument 
The central idea of this paper postulates that the historical depth of experience with state-level 
institutions, obtained over six millennia, exerts a persistent and U-shaped effect on today’s 
income inequality levels. More specifically, I propose that accumulated statehood experience, 
up to a point, helps strengthen a more egalitarian distribution of income within a country. 
Nevertheless, an excessive duration of state history leads to institutional stagnation and the 
emergence of powerful entrenched groups, which worsens a country’s income distribution.  
A key line of inquiry in the comparative development literature examines the role of 
statehood experience in explaining income differences across countries (see, e.g., Bockstette 
et al., 2002; Chanda & Putterman, 2007; Hariri, 2012; Ang, 2013a, 2013b; Borcan et al., 2018). 
Accordingly, an early development of historical states confers a country with better fiscal and 
legal capabilities, which critically affect investments and economic growth.6 Furthermore, 
Bockstette et al. (2002) highlight that long-standing states are endowed with more competent 
bureaucratic capabilities obtained through learning by doing. Hence, a well-functioning state 
is of importance for the process of institutional building because good institutions typically 
proliferate in countries with competent and well-trained bureaucrats (Ang, 2013b).7 By 
                                                             
6 This is in line with Dincecco and Katz (2016) who document that state capacity exerts a positive influence on 
long-run economic performance. These scholars, however, employ national government revenues per capita and 
non-military spending per capita to capture cross-country differences in state capacity. By contrast, the state 
history index constructed by Borcan et al. (2018) reflects experience with state-level institutions obtained 
throughout thousands of years in history. See Johnson and Koyama (2017) for a critical review of the literature 
on the relationship between state capacity and economic development.  
7 Several East Asian economies have recently experienced robust economic growth, which is mainly attributable 




contrast, newly established states tend to suffer from weakened fiscal capacity, thus deterring 
the efficiency of public administration (Besley & Persson, 2009; Borcan et al., 2018). 
 The above narrative suggests that countries lacking statehood experience suffer from 
weaker fiscal and organizational capabilities, leaving them with poorer institutional quality. 
This may intensify income inequality within a country through hindering progressive 
redistribution of income. This argument is consistent with the findings that income inequality 
tends to prevail in countries with inefficient tax administration and poor governance, which 
reduce the progressiveness of the tax system (Gupta et al., 2002). It is also plausible that 
strengthened fiscal capabilities allow a country to provide pro-poor social services that 
contribute to a more egalitarian society. Furthermore, a short duration of statehood experience 
implies a dearth of legitimate laws and regulations, which increases corrupt practices by public 
officials (Owen & Vu, 2020).8 Therefore, government bureaucrats in those countries with 
limited fiscal capacity to raise taxes tend to misuse public resources at the expense of the rest 
of society, leading to greater income inequality.9  
Borcan et al. (2018) argue that newly established states may experience greater political 
instability. This is mainly attributable to their frequently changing regimes caused by predatory 
attack and internal conflicts. Meanwhile, conventional wisdom holds that political instability 
is detrimental to economic prosperity and the distribution of income (see, e.g., Alesina & 
Perotti, 1996; Barro, 1996). It is widely perceived that a longer history of experience with state-
level institutions supports linguistic unity and national identity, thus fostering social trust and 
interactions (e.g., Diamond, 1997; Temple, 1998; Chanda & Putterman, 2007). A unified 
society reduces conflicts and political instability, which helps improve its income distribution. 
Furthermore, Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) find that internally fragmented societies 
are characterized by widespread poverty, thus exacerbating income differences within a 
country. A final argument holds that improved fiscal and legal capabilities, reflected in a longer 
                                                             
rules (legal capacity) and collect tax revenues to finance development objectives (see, e.g., Wade, 1990; Studwell, 
2013). This suggests that the state plays an essential role in fostering economic growth and development. 
8 Consistent with this view, there exists a hypothesis that greater instability in newly established states leads to 
more intense corruption because officials tend to expropriate public resources when their window of opportunity 
is short (see, e.g., Campante et al., 2009; Ferraz & Finan, 2011; Vu, 2020). 
9 Part of the arguments presented here implies that statehood experience may influence income distribution 
through affecting productivity, income levels, or the quality of institutions, which may be regarded as the 
proximate determinants of income inequality. Later, I will control for GDP per capita, institutional quality and 
other drivers of income inequality, which does not alter my findings. Hence, state history still exerts a direct 
influence on income inequality even when I partial out these proximate factors to reduce obtaining a spurious 
regression (see more details in Section 5).  
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history of state institutions, improve investments in human capital formation and health 
services, which in turn lower income inequality.  
However, I postulate that an excessive duration of state experience also comes with a 
cost of greater income inequality. The basic explanation for this argument is that a very long 
history of statehood is associated with institutional stagnation, corruption and reduced 
productivity, caused by an over-centralization of power, as suggested by some recent studies 
(see, for instance, Hariri, 2012; Lagerlöf, 2016; Borcan et al., 2018; Harish & Paik, 2019; Owen 
& Vu, 2020). This idea builds upon an early contribution by Olson (1993) who asserts that the 
first historical state emerged to address collective action problems in large communities and to 
protect farmers from attacks and expropriation by predators. Accordingly, stable states were 
developed when “roving bandits” were replaced by “stationary bandits” sustained by tax 
collecting tax revenues rather than by plundering. Nevertheless, Olson (1982, 1986) contends 
that very old and autonomous states may be conducive to the emergence of powerful elites. 
These entrenched groups eventually turned into “roving bandits”, maximizing private gains 
with the cost borne by the rest of the population. This institutional stagnation results in 
persistent income differences in societies with a very long history of statehood. It follows from 
these discussions that very long state history is harmful to a country’s distribution of income. 
In line with the above proposition, subsequent empirical studies find that very old and 
autonomous states suffer from underdevelopment. Hariri (2012), for instance, demonstrates 
that former colonies with excessive statehood experience is associated with autocratic 
institutions. The basic intuition behind this finding is that state experience at the timing of 
colonization limited the extent to which European colonizers could set up democratic 
institutions. Lagerlöf (2016) indicates that autocrats in very experienced states obtained large 
extractive capacity over time, thus becoming resistant to transiting toward democracy. Borcan 
et al. (2018) propose that very long-standing states lagged behind those with an intermediate 
length of statehood in terms of income per capita. This is partly attributable to reduced 
productivity caused by an over-centralization of power of powerful and entrenched groups. 
More recently, Owen and Vu (2020) contend that excessive statehood experience is 
positively associated with corruption levels mainly because powerful interest groups in these 
societies are more likely to exploit public resources for personal gain. Further, corrupt practices 
tend to be more widespread in states with an excessive length of state history because stability 
increases the interaction between government bureaucrats and the private sector (Campante et 
al., 2009). These findings suggest that income inequality also prevails in older and more 
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autonomous states besides those lacking statehood experience as presented earlier. Hence, the 
main hypothesis of this paper posits that the relationship between state history and income 
inequality follows a U-shaped pattern.10 
3. Estimation strategies 
3.1. Model specification 
I hypothesize that state history and income inequality exhibit a U-shaped relationship. To 
examine this proposition, I estimate the following model: 
!"#"$ = & + ()*+*,ℎ./*$ + 0)*+*,ℎ./*_/23$ + 45$ + 6$ 
in which  !"#" denotes an index of disposable income inequality. )*+*,ℎ./* and 
)*+*,ℎ./*_/23 are a measure of state antiquity and its squared term, respectively. ( and 0 
capture the hypothesized non-monotonic relationship between state history and income 
inequality. 5 is a vector of main control variables. 6 represents the unobserved error 
component. Subscript i stands for country i. 
I estimate the benchmark model using OLS regression. A key issue of drawing causal 
interpretations is omitted variable bias. More specifically, this potential bias exists if an omitted 
factor is correlated with both state history and the dependent variable, thus confounding the 
OLS estimates. It is worth emphasizing that reverse causation is unlikely to exist in this context. 
This is because it is difficult to envisage a direct channel of influence running from today’s 
degrees of income inequality to the development of historical states that took place several 
thousands of years ago. For this reason, it is plausible that accumulated statehood experience 
may provide exogenous sources of variation in current income inequality. Furthermore, 
previous studies examining the persistent effect of state history on economic performance 
typically treat state history as an exogenous variable (e.g., Bockstette et al., 2002; Chanda & 
Putterman, 2007; Putterman & Weil, 2010; Hariri, 2012; Ang, 2013b, 2013a; Borcan et al., 
2018). An additional issue is that the results may be confounded by measurement bias. 
To mitigate the above concerns, I first control for geographic endowments, primarily 
because these factors are widely regarded as the deep determinants of comparative 
development across countries. Further, a number of the drivers of income inequality are 
                                                             
10 To my knowledge, Borcan et al. (2018) and Owen and Vu (2020) are two studies documenting a non-monotonic 
relationship between state history and economic performance, which is in line with the main hypothesis of this 
paper. Using subnational data for European countries, Harish and Paik (2019) also find an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between state antiquity and income levels. 
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incorporated in the regression in Section 5. This helps address the possibility that my results 
just reflect the effect of a third omitted factor. This approach has been widely applied in the 
long-run development literature to reduce omitted variable bias (see, e.g., Acemoglu, 2009, Ch. 
4; Vu, 2020). As discussed above, state history is plausibly exogenous with respect to current 
economic performance and is treated as such in the influential studies cited in the previous 
paragraph. Nevertheless, I also estimate the model using 2SLS to check the sensitivity of my 
findings, which further mitigates omitted variables bias. Also, alternative measures of state 
antiquity and income inequality will be used as a robustness check. 
3.2. Variables’ descriptions and data  
Measuring income inequality 
I use the Gini coefficient taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
(SWIID) to measure the cross-country variation in income inequality (Solt, 2009) (Figure 1).11 
In particular, I utilize the Gini coefficient of net income as the benchmark dependent variable. 
This indicator reflects the level of income inequality within a country, taking into consideration 
the government’s efforts to redistribute income. There are two major advantages of using data 
from the SWIID. First, it has a wide coverage of both countries and years (Solt, 2009; Ferreira 
et al., 2015). This provides a general understanding of the relationship between state history 
and income inequality across the world. Second, the SWIID provides an internationally 
comparable measure of income inequality across countries, which is particularly relevant for 
exploring the link between income inequality and economic development (see, e.g., Solt, 2009; 
Berg et al., 2018).12 For these reasons, the SWIID index of income inequality has been widely 
used in recent studies to explore the causes and consequences of income inequality from a 
cross-country perspective (see, e.g., Jauch & Watzka, 2016; Berg et al., 2018; Lee & Vu, 2019). 
Other measures of income inequality will be employed in a sensitivity test. 
 
 
                                                             
11 To estimate cross-sectional data, I calculate the mean value of the SWIID Gini coefficients from 1960 to 2018. 
I also check whether my results are driven by this measurement in Section 5.  
12 Measuring income inequality across the world in a consistent manner provides a valid basis for statistical 
inference because it helps reduce potential measurement bias. This is challenging because the unit of analysis 
differs between different surveys that are used to measure income inequality (e.g., individual or household). 
Further, some surveys utilize information on gross income while others use net income (Berg et al., 2018). These 
issues are partly mitigated by Solt (2009) based on standardization and multiple imputation. See also Ferreira et 
al. (2015) for more details on the SWIID.  
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Measuring state history 
To capture cross-country differences in statehood experience, I use an index of state history 
constructed by Borcan et al. (2018), covering the period from 3500BCE to 2000CE (Figure 2). 
Accordingly, this measure captures the existence of historical states in each country dating 
back approximately six millennia when the first statehood was recorded (Borcan et al., 2018). 
The method of construction of this index is mainly based on Bockstette et al. (2002) by 
measuring the presence of states above the tribal level, the autonomy of the state, and its 
territorial coverage across 110 50-year periods from 3500BCE to 2000CE. The measurement 
can be explained by the following equation: 
)*+*,ℎ./*$7 =
∑ (1 + 4)<=7 × /$<7<?@
∑ (1 + 4)<=7 × 507<?@
 
in which * stands for a 50-year period. /$< is the state history index for each country in a given 
period of which the maximum achievable value is 50. In particular, /$< of each present-day 
country is calculated by multiplying scores for three dimensions reflecting the existence of the 
state, its autonomy, and its territorial coverage and 50 as follows: 
/$< = )$<CDEFEGE × )$<HI<JGJKL × )$<MJNEDHOE × 50 
where )$<CDEFEGE equals 1 if there was the government above the tribal level in a given period 
(and 0.75 if the government could be at best described as a paramount chiefdom, and zero 
otherwise). )$<HI<JGJKL takes a value of 1 if the rule was locally based (and zero if it was ruled 
by a foreign government, and 0.75 if the rule was locally based but with considerable foreign 
oversight. )$<MJNEDHOE equals 1 if the territorial coverage of the state was greater than 50 percent, 
(and 0.75, 0.5 and 0.3 if the coverage was 25-30 percent, 10-25 percent, and below 10 percent, 
respectively). 
Next, the sum of /$< across 110 periods of 50 years is computed using a commonly 
presumed discount rate (e.g., 4 = 1%) to consider that more distant periods have less important 
implications for contemporary economic performance (e.g., Bockstette et al., 2002; Borcan et 
al., 2018). The final step is to divide these values by their maximum possible value of 50 to 
obtain an overall index of state history for each country, ranging between zero and one. The 
benchmark measure of state history is calculated across six millennia, which corresponds to 
110 50-year periods (Q = 0,… ,109). Hence, other measures of state history covering different 
periods in history can be computed by adjusting the value of Q to check for robustness of the 
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findings. I also assume alternative discount rates to consider the possibility that the results are 
driven by this measurement.13 
Control variables 
To minimize omitted variables bias, I incorporate a number of control variables in the 
regression, including geographic endowments and continent dummies. Specifically, the 
inclusion of geographic controls is largely motivated by several studies documenting the role 
of geography in shaping comparative economic performance across countries. For instance, 
some scholars argue that geographic endowments exert a direct influence on international 
income differences (Sachs, 2003; Carstensen & Gundlach, 2006), while others posit that 
geography helps shape the quality of institutions, thus affecting income differences in the world 
(Easterly & Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004). 
While the relative importance of geography versus institutions in fostering economic 
development remains largely inconclusive, geographic endowments are widely included as 
control variables in the long-term comparative development literature (see, e.g., Acemoglu et 
al., 2001; Knowles & Owen, 2010; Ang, 2013a, 2013b; Borcan et al., 2018; Vu, 2019, 2020). 
Therefore, I control for a number of geographic variables in the baseline model, including 
absolute latitude, mean elevation, distance to coast, precipitation, temperature, malaria, and a 
dummy for being landlocked (see the online appendix for a description of these variables and 
data sources). Importantly, if geographic factors affect income differences across countries 
through impacting institutional quality, they can also matter for a country’s income 
distribution. Later, I will also control for a number of factors that have been regarded as key 
determinants of income inequality in previous studies (Section 5).  
A key concern is that the baseline findings may be confounded by unobserved region-
specific factors.14 Countries located in the same continent, for instance, may share common 
cultural, historical or geographic characteristics, which may arguably affect the distribution of 
income and the development of historical states. Additionally, statehood experience and 
contemporary economic outcomes may transcend national borders (Borcan et al., 2018). For 
this reason, they may be subject to common shocks or productivity spillovers. These issues, if 
                                                             
13 See also Bockstette et al. (2002) and Borcan et al. (2018) for more details on the construction of the state history 
index. Alternative measures of state history are employed in robustness checks to minimize potential measurement 
bias as presented in Section 5. 
14 Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that there exists considerable variation in income inequality and state history across 
regions in the world. These regional differences suggest that my findings may be confounded by unobserved 
region-specific characteristics.  
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not accounted for, may yield a spurious relationship between state history and income 
inequality. Thus, I first mitigate this problem by including continent dummies in the benchmark 
model. Later, I also account for spatial dependence by re-calculating conventional standard 
errors in Section 5, following Conley (1999). 
It is important to emphasize that previous studies in the fundamental development 
literature typically do not control for proximate determinants of economic performance (see, 
e.g., Ang, 2013b, 2013a; Owen, 2017; Borcan et al., 2018). The basic intuition is that including 
these factors in the regression may capture some of the effect of state history on today’s 
economic development. Nevertheless, I will include the proximate determinants of income 
inequality to check the sensitivity of the baseline findings later in Section 5.  
4. Main results 
The main proposition of this study posits that the relationship between state history and income 
inequality exhibits a U-shaped pattern. Figure 3 illustrates a non-monotonic relationship 
between the historical experience with statehood and income inequality. In particular, both 
long-standing and newly established states suffer from high levels of income inequality. By 
contrast, those with an intermediate length of statehood are among the most egalitarian 
societies. This lends support to the arguments presented in Section 2. Nevertheless, achieving 
causal interpretations requires controlling for a number of confounding factors. For this reason, 
I first estimate the benchmark model, and present the core findings in Table 1. 
The baseline estimates are broadly consistent with the main hypothesis of this study 
(Table 1). In column (1) of Table 1, I report the unconditional estimates, which are suggestive 
of a U-shaped relationship between state history and income inequality. In particular, the 
estimated coefficient of state history is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Furthermore, its squared term has a statistically significant and positive effect on the level of 
income inequality. These findings reveal that statehood experience at first reduces income 
inequality but eventually worsens income distribution within an economy. This non-monotonic 
relationship is largely consistent with recent studies arguing that underdevelopment prevails in 
countries with either a lack of statehood experience or an excessive duration of state antiquity 
(Borcan et al., 2018; Harish & Paik, 2019; Owen & Vu, 2020). 
Geographic endowments are added to column (2) of Table 1. Accordingly, this inclusion 
does not alter the baseline findings although the magnitude of the estimated coefficients of state 
history and its squared term reduces significantly. To rule out the possibility that the results 
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reflect unobserved region-specific factors, I incorporate continent dummies in the benchmark 
model (column 3, Table 1). Nevertheless, the non-linear relationship between state history and 
income inequality remains precisely estimated at the 1% level of significance. Overall, I find 
that the historical depth of experience with state-level institutions, obtained across six 
millennia, exerts a U-shaped influence on contemporary income inequality, controlling for 
geographic variables and continent dummies.15 
5. Sensitivity analysis 
Robustness to endogeneity 
As explained earlier, reverse causality is unlikely to be a key issue of identification in this 
context, and previous studies typically treat statehood experience as exogenous sources of 
variation in economic performance across countries. The baseline findings can still be biased 
and inconsistent if the main variables of interest are correlated with the error term. Later, I will 
address this concern by controlling for a number of confounding factors that may be correlated 
with both state history and income inequality. However, there may still exist some unobserved 
factors that may be difficult to identify and measure in a world sample. It is also necessary to 
consider potential measurement bias. To address these concerns, I employ geographic 
proximity to the regional frontiers in 1000BCE (Proximity) as an instrumental variable for state 
history. Following Ashraf and Galor (2013) and Wooldridge (2010, pp. 265-268), I create an 
instrument for state history squared using the squared term of the fitted values of state history 
obtained in the first-stage regression.16 
                                                             
15 To avoid obtaining a spurious relationship between statehood and income inequality, I conduct Ramsey’s test 
of functional form misspecification under the null hypothesis of correct model specification (Ramsey, 1969). This 
empirical exercise is implemented by obtaining the fitted values from the estimates reported in each column of 
Table 1. Next, the square, cube and the fourth power of these predicted values are included in the regression to 
conduct a test of joint significance. Accordingly, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the model is correctly 
specified at conventionally accepted levels of significance (except in column 1, Table 1). This lends support to 
the validity of the baseline estimates. Furthermore, I check for the normal distribution of the error terms, following 
Doornik and Hansen (2008). The results reported in Table 1 indicate that we fail to reject the null hypothesis that 
the residuals are normally distributed. These diagnostic tests is partly suggestive that the baseline models are 
adequately specified, thus lending support to causal inference. See Owen (2017) for detailed discussions on 
diagnostic testing for model misspecification in the long-term development literature.    
16 In particular, I first regress state history on Proximity, including a set of baseline control variables and continent 
dummies. Next, the square of the fitted values calculated from this regression is used as an instrumental variable 




Data for Proximity are obtained from Ang (2015) that examines the determinants of the 
emergence and development of historical states.17 More specifically, regional frontiers for each 
continent in 1000BCE are identified as areas with the largest urban settlements (Modelski, 
2003; Ang, 2015). This is largely based on the proposition that only affluent regions could 
afford high population density. In this regard, Ang (2015) identifies the regional frontiers based 
on historical data on urban settlements collected from various sources. Following Ashraf and 
Galor (2013), he constructs geographic proximity to those leaders using the Haversine 
formula.18 Higher values correspond to greater geographic proximity to the regional leaders. 
There are good reasons to believe that Proximity is a valid instrument for state history. 
First, Ang (2015) examines a world sample of countries, and find that geographic proximity to 
regional leaders in 1000BCE plays an important role in the formation and development of 
historical states. The explanation rests on the premise that geographic distance acts as a barrier 
to knowledge diffusion, trade and economic interactions. In addition, countries located near the 
regional frontiers could benefit from the dissemination of technologies and state knowledge, 
which are conducive to the formation and development of historical states (Ang, 2015). This 
lends support to the argument that Proximity is not a weak instrument for state history. 
Second, the instrumental variable reasonably exerts no direct influence on today’s income 
inequality. Countries located near the regional leaders in 1000BCE could benefit from the 
dissemination of state experience at that time. It may follow from this argument that geographic 
distance also impedes the diffusion of today’s state-level institutions, which may affect current 
income inequality. However, most regional leaders in 1000BCE have ceased to exist as 
contemporary regional leaders (Ang, 2015).19 This suggests that the advantage of being 
proximate to regional leaders might matter for economic development in the distant past but 
not in the present time. To my knowledge, there is also no empirical evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that income inequality transcends borders, making it difficult to envisage whether 
geographic distance matters for a country’s income distribution. Therefore, Proximity arguably 
has no direct effect on contemporary economic development across the world. This at least 
                                                             
17 The author thanks James B Ang for kindly sharing data on this variable. 
18 Proximity is calculated by the following formulae: 
V3WX.Y.*Z = 1 − \]./*$,^_]./*KH`a 
in which ]./*$,^_ denotes the geographic distance between country i and the regional leader, and ]./*KH`	stands 
for to the maximum distance in the sample. Higher values correspond to greater geographic proximity to the 
regional frontiers in 1000BCE. See Ang (2015) for more details. 
19 Details are presented in Ang (2015). 
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partially suggests that I can isolate plausibly exogenous sources of variation in state history 
using geographic distance to the regional frontiers in 1000BCE. 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the exogeneity assumption cannot be 
empirically validated mainly because of the unobserved nature of the disturbance terms. The 
validity of the instrument, therefore, largely relies on theoretical justification (see, e.g., Owen, 
2017). To address this concern, I employ the fractionally resampled Anderson-Rubin test 
(FAR) developed by Berkowitz et al. (2012) to check for the sensitivity of the IV-2SLS 
estimates under some minor degrees of deviation from the exogeneity condition. The FAR test 
is based on the Anderson-Rubin test (AR) that allows obtaining valid inference under weak 
instruments. More specifically, Berkowitz et al. (2012) modify the AR test based on the 
jackknife histogram estimator of Wu (1990) to account for the possibility that the instrumental 
variable may be not perfectly exogenous. This test, therefore, allows obtaining causal inference 
even when the exogeneity assumption is slightly violated. 
The IV-2SLS estimates are reported in Table 2. According to the results in columns (2) 
and (3), the instrumental variables are found to have a statistically significant effect on state 
history and its squared term. The values of the F-test of excluded instruments are also larger 
than the rule-of-thumb value of 10. This justifies the relevance of the instrumental variables 
used in the IV regression. The second-stage estimates reported in column (1) are broadly 
consistent with the OLS estimates. This reinforces the baseline findings that statehood 
experience has a U-shaped relationship with income inequality, controlling for potential 
endogeneity concerns. The FAR test result indicates that we can reject the null of no statistically 
significant effect of state history on income inequality at the 5% level even when the 
instruments slightly deviate from the perfect exogeneity condition. 
Robustness to additional controls 
The above results demonstrate that the baseline findings are largely robust to using an IV 
approach, which at least partially accounts for omitted variables bias. To rule out the possibility 
that my findings just reflect a third unobserved factor, I incorporate a number of additional 
control variables in the regression.20 
A key line of inquiry in the long-run development literature reveals that other early 
development indicators are essential for economic prosperity. The timing of Neolithic 
                                                             
20 The estimated coefficients of these additional control variables are not reported in Table 4 to conserve space. 
However, they are available on request. 
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revolution, for instance, matters for income differences (see, e.g., Galor & Moav, 2007; 
Putterman & Weil, 2010; Ang, 2013b). Furthermore, Ang (2015) finds that countries adopting 
sedentary agriculture earlier experienced improved productivity, technologies, fiscal capacity 
and better institutions. These factors acted as a catalyst for the emergence and development of 
historical states across the globe. Other studies posit that the length of time elapsed since the 
first human settlement and genetic diversity help explain comparative development across 
countries (Ahlerup & Olsson, 2012; Ashraf & Galor, 2013). Thus, one may argue that the 
baseline estimates just reflect the persistent effect of these early development factors on 
statehood experience and contemporary economic performance. This is because these factors 
are comparable to state history when it comes to reflecting a country’s early development. If 
statehood experience, as proposed in this study, matters for today’s degrees of income 
inequality, these factors may exert an influence on income distribution, thus confounding the 
benchmark findings. Therefore, I allow these variables to enter the baseline regression in a 
quadratic form, which is in line with my arguments in Section 2.21 The results in Table 3 
indicate that including these factors in the benchmark model does not alter the core results. 
Another identification strategy is to control for a series of factors that help explain cross-
country differences in income inequality (Table 4).22 These variables are key drivers of income 
inequality as established in many studies cited below. Following the long-term development 
literature, I incorporate legal origins, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, religions, and social 
trust in the benchmark model from columns (2) to (5) of Table 4 (see, e.g., La Porta et al., 1999; 
Acemoglu et al., 2001; Alesina et al., 2003; Klerman et al., 2011; Naveed & Wang, 2018). The 
baseline estimates, however, retain their sign and significance levels when I account for these 
potential confounding factors. An additional concern holds that the abundance of land may 
reduce the unequal distribution of land within a country, thus hindering income inequality 
(Naveed & Wang, 2018). Hence, I employ an index of land suitability for agriculture and the 
fraction of arable land as control variables (column 6, Table 4). 
                                                             
21 The timing of Neolithic transition, the duration of human settlement are comparable to state history as measures 
of a country’s early development. For this reason, I control for these variables and their squared terms in the 
regression. Ashraf and Galor (2013) find that predicted genetic diversity has an inverted U-shaped relationship 
with the cross-country variation in income per capita. This lends support to the non-linear specification as shown 
in Table 3. The baseline results also prevail when I exclude the square of these variables. See the online appendix 
for variables’ descriptions and data sources.  




A number of studies also document the effect of age dependence ratio on income 
inequality levels (e.g., Lam & Levison, 1992; Deaton & Paxson, 1997; Razin et al., 2002; 
Furceri & Ostry, 2019). Therefore, I account for this factor in column (7) of Table 4. A final 
set of control variables is added to the regression, including income per capita, institutional 
quality, trade openness, financial development, and the quality of human capital (column 8, 
Table 4).23 The inclusion of GDP per capita is mainly because economic development may 
affect income distribution. As discussed earlier, state history is a key determinant of cross-
country differences in income levels, institutional quality and financial development. Thus, 
controlling for these factors helps partial out the effect of state history on economic 
development as found in previous studies. This helps address a concern that the core results 
merely reflect the correlation between state history and economic development established in 
previous papers. 
Accordingly, the U-shaped relationship between state history and income inequality 
withstands controlling for these contemporary determinants of income inequality. Even when 
I include all additional controls in one regression, which reduces the feasible sample size 
significantly, the effect of state history and its squared term on income inequality remains very 
precisely estimated at conventionally accepted levels of significance (column 9, Table 4). 
Overall, I find that statehood experience exerts a statistically significant influence on today’s 
degrees of income inequality, controlling for a range of drivers of inequality.  
Robustness to potential measurement bias 
Another challenge of identification stems from potential measurement bias. In particular, the 
baseline measure of statehood experience, obtained from Borcan et al. (2018), is constructed 
from 3500BCE, the timing when the first statehood was recorded, to 2000CE. According to 
Borcan et al. (2018), their extended measure of state history covers the period before the 
Common Era, which was largely ignored by Bockstette et al. (2002). This helps capture the 
cross-country variation in accumulated state experience better. 
To reduce potential measurement bias, I employ alternative measures of state history, 
calculated across different periods in history (Panel A, Table 5). In column (1), I use an index 
of state antiquity, measured by excluding the period from 1500CE to 2000CE. This empirical 
                                                             
23 The baseline findings remain largely insensitive to controlling for the both GDP per capita and its squared term, 
following the well-known Kuznets hypothesis of Kuznets (1955). Following Haan and Sturm (2017) and Furceri 
and Ostry (2019), I also control for the level of financial development, trade globalization, and human capital.  
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experience is partly motivated by a concern that the results may be confounded by statehood 
experience obtained during the period of European colonization, which is widely documented 
as a key determinant of global income differences (Acemoglu et al., 2001). Following 
Putterman and Weil (2010), I use an ancestry-adjusted measure of state history in column (2) 
of Table 5. The basic intuition of this robustness test is to account for state experience, 
institutions, and technologies that are attributable to mass migration starting from the sixteenth 
century.24 Overall, I find that the non-linear relationship between state history and income 
inequality remains largely insensitive to accounting for the effect of colonization and 
migration. 
As discussed earlier, Borcan et al. (2018) assume a 1% discount rate when constructing 
the state history index. This is mainly motivated by the fact that statehood experience obtained 
in more distant periods is less relevant for current economic performance. For this reason, the 
authors give more weight to more recent periods. To check whether the baseline findings are 
confounded by this measurement, I employ alternative measures of state antiquity, calculated 
by assuming different discount rates (Panel B, Table 5). In particular, the state history 
indicators used in columns (3) to (8) of Table 5 is computed by assuming a 0.1% and 2% 
discount rate, following Borcan et al. (2018). The sign and significance levels of the estimated 
coefficients of state history and its squared terms appear to be largely robust to this exercise. 
The results presented Table 5 altogether suggest that the baseline findings remain largely 
insensitive to using alternative measures of state history, and the persistent effect of migration 
and colonization on comparative prosperity. 
As an additional robustness test of measurement bias, I use alternative measures of 
income inequality as dependent variables. The results are reported in the Appendix Table A1. 
More specifically, I employ an index of market income inequality instead of relying on the 
disposable income measure in the baseline model. I also adopt the GINI index taken from the 
World Income Inequality Database (WIID).25 Furthermore, I use the average of the GINI 
coefficient from 1960 to 2018 in the baseline regression, which is mainly dictated by the 
availability of data. To check for the possibility that my findings are driven by this empirical 
approach, I re-calculate the main dependent variable using different periods (Table A1).  
However, the benchmark findings remain largely insensitive to this empirical exercise.  
                                                             
24 See Putterman and Weil (2010) for details on the constructions of the ancestry-adjusted state history index. 
25 Data are obtained from the UNU-WIDER (https://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database). 
Jenkins (2015) provides a detailed discussion on the SWIID and WIID measures of income inequality. 
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Robustness to colonization and (historical) migration flows 
As presented in Panel A of Table 5, I attempt to address a concern that my findings may be 
confounded by the persistent effect of European colonization and mass migration, starting from 
the sixteenth century (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2002; Putterman & Weil, 
2010).26 Importantly, the set of control variables used in the benchmark regression includes the 
fraction of the population at risk of contracting malaria, which is widely regarded as an essential 
determinant of the type of institutions established by European colonial powers (Acemoglu et 
al., 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2002). Hence, the disease environment, captured by malaria at least 
in part reduces the effect that my findings are driven by colonization and migration. 
In this section, I consider this potential bias more thoroughly by estimating alternative 
samples as reported in Table 6. The baseline estimates are replicated mainly for ease of 
comparison. Specifically, I employ the World Migration Matrix, constructed by Putterman and 
Weil (2010), to restrict the sample size based on the proportion of indigenous people (as of 
1500) in the current population  (columns 2 to 5, Table 6). In the last two columns of Table 6, 
I break the sample size into 54 countries that were never colonized and 74 former colonies. The 
sign and significance levels of the baseline findings remain broadly unchanged when 
estimating different sub-samples. Therefore, the U-shaped relationship between state history 
and income inequality is insensitive to accounting for the impact of colonization and 
(historical) migration flows. 
Other robustness checks 
To achieve causal interpretations from my findings, I conduct several additional sensitivity 
tests, which are presented in the online appendix. First, I rule out the possibility that the 
baseline results may be confounded by unobserved region-specific factors. Indeed, this concern 
is partly addressed by incorporating continent dummies in the benchmark regressions. I 
perform an additional sensitivity test by re-estimating the baseline model using sub-samples 
with different regional coverage (the Appendix Table A2). In particular, I sequentially drop 
countries located in each continent to check whether the results are driven by the inclusion of 
a particular region. The baseline findings, however, retain their sign and statistical significance 
when I estimate different sub-samples of countries. 
                                                             
26 A wealth of literature has indicated that the historical event of European colonization exerts a persistent 
influence on today’s differences in institutional quality and income per capita (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Acemoglu 
et al., 2002). In addition, there has been mass migration across countries since the sixteenth century, which 
arguably affects institutions and income levels (Putterman & Weil, 2010). 
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Second, a crucial challenge of identification, as highlighted by Borcan et al. (2018), is 
that accumulated statehood experience and contemporary economic performance may 
transcend borders. The basic explanation for this argument posits that there may exist 
productivity spillovers and common shocks between countries. The presence of such spatial 
dependence may confound the conventional OLS estimates. To address this concern, I re-
estimate the conventional standard errors that account for spatial dependence across countries, 
following Conley (1999). This empirical exercise has been recently applied in the long-term 
comparative development literature to obtain valid statistical inference under the presence of 
spatial spillovers (see, e.g., Ashraf & Galor, 2013; Borcan et al., 2018; Vu, 2020).27 The 
estimation results are reported in the Appendix Table A3, which demonstrates that my findings 
are largely robust to accounting for potential spatial dependence. 
Finally, I thoroughly examine whether the baseline results withstand excluding outliers 
in the Appendix Table A4. Countries are identified as outliers using different methods, 
including computing the Cook’s distance, the standardized residuals, and robust regression 
weights.28 In all cases, the U-shaped relationship between state history and income inequality 
remains statistically significant at conventionally accepted levels. Therefore, the baseline 
findings are not driven by potential outliers. 
Further evidence on the U-shaped relationship 
As presented above, I incorporate the squared term of state antiquity in the standard 
regression model to test the existence of a U-shaped relationship. The core results lend 
empirical support to the central hypothesis discussed in Section 2. The findings also withstand 
a battery of sensitivity checks. To draw causal interpretations, I further conduct an additional 
statistical test and check for the possibility of a higher-order non-linear relationship. 
First, I perform the U-shaped test of Lind and Mehlum (2010) that builds upon an early 
study by Sasabuchi (1980). The basic idea of the U-shaped test is to check whether the 
hypothesized relationship is decreasing at low values of the state history index and increasing 
within high values (Lind & Mehlum, 2010). To conduct this empirical exercise, I employ the 
baseline estimates reported in Table 1. The results are presented at the end of the Appendix 
                                                             
27 The intuition of this method is to calculate the weighted covariance matrices, in which the weights correspond 
to the inverse of the distance between countries. Furthermore, the weights equal zero after a specified threshold. 
Following Borcan et al. (2018), I specify a threshold of twenty coordinate degrees. The results are also largely 
insensitive to using another threshold of fifty coordinate degrees as shown in Table A3. See also Ashraf & Galor 
(2013) for discussions on this method. 
28 I present details in Table A4 of the online appendix. 
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Table A3. Accordingly, we can reject the null hypothesis of that state history and income 
inequality exhibit a monotonic or inverted U-shaped relationship at conventionally accepted 
levels of significance. This lends credence to the baseline findings. Second, I replicate the 
baseline estimates by including a cubic term of state history in the regression model to check 
for the presence of a higher-order relationship in the Appendix Table A5. However, the 
estimated coefficient of state history cubed is statistically insignificant, which reveals that we 
can reject the existence of a higher-order correlation. Overall, the results suggest that the U-
shaped relationship between state history and income inequality is robust.  
6. Conclusion 
The formation and development of historical states have been documented as a key determinant 
of cross-country differences in GDP per capita. Other studies also postulate that accumulated 
statehood experience helps improve institutional quality and the level of financial development. 
This paper extends this literature by documenting a robust relationship between state antiquity 
and contemporary income inequality levels, estimating data for up to 153 countries. I find that 
the state history and income inequality exhibit a U-shaped pattern. In particular, statehood 
experience at first helps reduce income inequality but eventually increase it. This suggests that 
societies endowed with an intermediate length of state history enjoy the most egalitarian 
distribution of income. My findings are largely insensitive to performing a battery of robustness 
checks. To my knowledge, this is the first study documenting a robust U-shaped relationship 
between state antiquity and today’s income inequality. 
References 
Acemoglu, D. (2009). Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2001). The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: An Empirical Investigation. American Economic Review, 91(5), 1369-
1401. 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. A. (2002). Reversal of Fortune: Geography and 
Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 117(4), 1231-1294. 
Ahlerup, P., & Olsson, O. (2012). The Roots of Ethnic Diversity. Journal of Economic Growth, 
17(2), 71-102. 
Alesina, A., Devleeschauwer, A., Easterly, W., Kurlat, S., & Wacziarg, R. (2003). 
Fractionalization. Journal of Economic Growth, 8(2), 155-194. 
Alesina, A., & Perotti, R. (1996). Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment. 
European Economic Review, 40(6), 1203-1228. 
21 
 
Ang, J. B. (2013a). Are Modern Financial Systems Shaped by State Antiquity? Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 37(11), 4038-4058. 
Ang, J. B. (2013b). Institutions and the Long-Run Impact of Early Development. Journal of 
Development Economics, 105, 1-18. 
Ang, J. B. (2015). What Drives the Historical Formation and Persistent Development of 
Territorial States? Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 117(4), 1134-1175. 
Ashraf, Q., & Galor, O. (2013). The 'Out of Africa' Hypothesis, Human Genetic Diversity, and 
Comparative Economic Development. American Economic Review, 103(1), 1-46. 
Barro, R. J. (1996). Democracy and Growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 1(1), 1-27. 
Bartels, L. M. (2009). Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Bazzi, S., & Clemens, M. A. (2013). Blunt Instruments: Avoiding Common Pitfalls in 
Identifying the Causes of Economic Growth. American Economic Journal: 
Macroeconomics, 5(2), 152-186. 
Berg, A., Ostry, J. D., Tsangarides, C. G., & Yakhshilikov, Y. (2018). Redistribution, 
Inequality, and Growth: New Evidence. Journal of Economic Growth, 23(3), 259-305. 
Berkowitz, D., Caner, M., & Fang, Y. (2012). The Validity of Instruments Revisited. Journal 
of Econometrics, 166(2), 255-266. 
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2009). The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, 
and Politics. American Economic Review, 99(4), 1218-1244. 
Bockstette, V., Chanda, A., & Putterman, L. (2002). States and Markets: The Advantage of an 
Early Start. Journal of Economic Growth, 7(4), 347-369. 
Borcan, O., Olsson, O., & Putterman, L. (2018). State History and Economic Development: 
Evidence from Six Millennia. Journal of Economic Growth, 23(1), 1-40. 
Campante, F. R., Chor, D., & Do, Q.-A. (2009). Instability and the Incentives for Corruption. 
Economics & Politics, 21(1), 42-92. 
Carstensen, K., & Gundlach, E. (2006). The Primacy of Institutions Reconsidered: Direct 
Income Effects of Malaria Prevalence. World Bank Economic Review, 20(3), 309-339. 
Chanda, A., & Putterman, L. (2007). Early Starts, Reversals and Catch‐up in the Process of 
Economic Development. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 109(2), 387-413. 
Conley, T. G. (1999). GMM Estimation with Cross Sectional Dependence. Journal of 
Econometrics, 92(1), 1-45. 
Deaton, A. S., & Paxson, C. H. (1997). The Effects of Economic and Population Growth on 
National Saving and Inequality. Demography, 34(1), 97-114. 
Diamond, J. (1997). Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York: 
Norton. 
Dincecco, M., & Katz, G. (2016). State Capacity and Long-Run Economic Performance. 
Economic Journal, 126(590), 189-218. 
Doornik, J. A., & Hansen, H. (2008). An Omnibus Test for Univariate and Multivariate 
Normality. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 70(s1), 927-939. 
Easterly, W. (2007). Inequality Does Cause Underdevelopment: Insights from a New 
Instrument. Journal of Development Economics, 84(2), 755-776. 
Easterly, W., & Levine, R. (2003). Tropics, Germs, and Crops: How Endowments Influence 
Economic Development. Journal of Monetary Economics, 50(1), 3-39. 
22 
 
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2011). Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the 
Audits of Local Governments. American Economic Review, 101(4), 1274-1311. 
Ferreira, F. H. G., Lustig, N., & Teles, D. (2015). Appraising Cross-National Income Inequality 
Databases: An Introduction. Journal of Economic Inequality, 13(4), 497-526. 
Förster, M. F., & Tóth, I. G. (2015). Cross-Country Evidence of the Multiple Causes of 
Inequality Changes in the OECD Area. In A. B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (Eds.), 
Handbook of Income Distribution (Vol. 2, pp. 1729-1843): Elsevier. 
Furceri, D., & Ostry, J. D. (2019). Robust Determinants of Income Inequality. Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy, 35(3), 490-517. 
Galor, O., & Moav, O. (2007). The Neolithic Revolution and Contemporary Variations in Life 
Expectancy. Department of Economics, Brown University.   
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Alonso-Terme, R. (2002). Does Corruption Affect Income 
Inequality and Poverty? Economics of Governance, 3(1), 23-45. 
Haan, J. d., & Sturm, J.-E. (2017). Finance and Income Inequality: A Review and New 
Evidence. European Journal of Political Economy, 50, 171-195. 
Hariri, J. G. (2012). The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood. American Political Science 
Review, 106(3), 471-494. 
Harish, S. P., & Paik, C. (2019). Historical State Stability and Economic Development in 
Europe. Political Science Research and Methods, forthcoming. 
Jauch, S., & Watzka, S. (2016). Financial Development and Income Inequality: A Panel Data 
Approach. Empirical Economics, 51(1), 291-314. 
Jenkins, S. P. (2015). World Income Inequality Databases: An Assessment of WIID and 
SWIID. Journal of Economic Inequality, 13(4), 629-671. 
Johnson, N. D., & Koyama, M. (2017). States and Economic Growth: Capacity and 
Constraints. Explorations in Economic History, 64, 1-20. 
Klerman, D. M., Spamann, H., Weinstein, M. I., & Mahoney, P. G. (2011). Legal Origin or 
Colonial History? Journal of Legal Analysis, 3(2), 379-409. 
Knowles, S., & Owen, P. D. (2010). Which Institutions Are Good for Your Health? The Deep 
Determinants of Comparative Cross-Country Health Status. Journal of Development 
Studies, 46(4), 701-723. 
Kuznets, S. (1955). Economic Growth and Income Inequality. American Economic Review, 
45(1), 1-28. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1999). The Quality of 
Government. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15(1), 222-279. 
Lagerlöf, N.-P. (2016). Statehood, Democracy and Preindustrial Development. Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control, 67, 58-72. 
Lam, D., & Levison, D. (1992). Age, Experience, and Schooling: Decomposing Earnings 
Inequality in the United States and Brazil. Sociological Inquiry, 62(2), 220-245. 
Lee, K.-K. (2014). Globalization, Income Inequality and Poverty: Theory and Empirics. Social 
System Studies, 28, 109-134. 
Lee, K.-K., & Vu, T. V. (2019). Economic Complexity, Human Capital and Income Inequality: 
A Cross-Country Analysis. Japanese Economic Review, forthcoming. 
Lind, J. T., & Mehlum, H. (2010). With or without U? The Appropriate Test for a U-Shaped 
Relationship. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 72(1), 109-118. 
23 
 
Michalopoulos, S., & Papaioannou, E. (2013). National Institutions and Subnational 
Development in Africa. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(1), 151-213. 
Modelski, G. (2003). World Cities: -3000 to 2000. Washington, DC: Faros. 
Naveed, A., & Wang, C. (2018). Can Religion Explain Cross-Country Differences in 
Inequality? A Global Perspective. Social Choice and Welfare, 50(3), 481-518. 
Olson, M. (1982). The Rise and Decline of Nations. New Haven, United States: Yale University 
Press. 
Olson, M. (1986). A Theory of the Incentives Facing Political Organizations: Neo-Corporatism 
and the Hegemonic State. International Political Science Review, 7(2), 165-189. 
Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. American Political Science 
Review, 87(3), 567-576. 
Owen, P. D. (2017). Evaluating Ingenious Instruments for Fundamental Determinants of Long-
Run Economic Growth and Development. Econometrics, 5(3), 1-33. 
Owen, P. D., & Vu, T. V. (2020). State History and Corruption. Department of Economics, 
University of Otago.   
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1994). Is Inequality Harmful for Growth? American Economic 
Review, 84(3), 600-621. 
Pickett, K. E., & Wilkinson, R. G. (2010). Inequality: An Underacknowledged Source of 
Mental Illness and Distress. British Journal of Psychiatry, 197(6), 426-428. 
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Putterman, L., & Weil, D. N. (2010). Post-1500 Population Flows and the Long-Run 
Determinants of Economic Growth and Inequality. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
125(4), 1627-1682. 
Ramsey, J. B. (1969). Tests for Specification Errors in Classical Linear Least-Squares 
Regression Analysis. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B 
(Methodological), 31(2), 350-371. 
Razin, A., Sadka, E., & Swagel, P. (2002). The Aging Population and the Size of the Welfare 
State. Journal of Political Economy, 110(4), 900-918. 
Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A., & Trebbi, F. (2004). Institutions Rule: The Primacy of 
Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. Journal of 
Economic Growth, 9(2), 131-165. 
Sachs, J. (2003). Institutions Don't Rule: Direct Effects of Geography on Per Capita Income. 
National Bureau of Economic Research.   
Sasabuchi, S. (1980). A Test of a Multivariate Normal Mean with Composite Hypotheses 
Determined by Linear Inequalities. Biometrika, 67(2), 429-439. 
Solt, F. (2009). Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database. Social Science 
Quarterly, 90(2), 231-242. 
Stiglitz, J. (2012). The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our 
Future. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 
Studwell, J. (2013). How Asia Works: Success and Failure in the World's Most Dynamic 
Region. London: Profile Books Ltd. 
Temple, J. (1998). Initial Conditions, Social Capital and Growth in Africa. Journal of African 
Economies, 7(3), 309-347. 
24 
 
Vu, T. V. (2019). Does Institutional Quality Foster Economic Complexity? University of Otago 
Economics Discussion Papers No. 1909.   
Vu, T. V. (2020). Climate, Diseases, and the Origins of Corruption. University of Otago 
Economics Discussion Papers No. 2001.   
Wade, R. (1990). Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East 
Asian Industrialization. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (2nd ed.). 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
Wu, C. F. J. (1990). On the Asymptotic Properties of the Jackknife Histogram. Annals of 






Figure 1. Cross-country differences in income inequality 
 
Figure 2. Cross-country differences in state history (3500BCE – 2000CE) 
 











 Adding  
continent dummies 
(Full specification) 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent variable is disposable income inequality 
      
State history  -0.711***  -0.409***  -0.445*** 
 [0.122]  [0.103]  [0.119] 
State history squared 0.915***  0.348**  0.421*** 
 [0.188]  [0.142]  [0.153] 
Absolute latitude   -0.107  -0.043 
   [0.090]  [0.091] 
Mean elevation   0.068***  0.072*** 
   [0.012]  [0.012] 
Landlocked    -0.027*  -0.029* 
   [0.014]  [0.015] 
Distance to coast   0.000  0.000 
   [0.000]  [0.000] 
Precipitation    -0.001  0.000 
   [0.001]  [0.001] 
Temperature    0.006***  0.007*** 
   [0.002]  [0.002] 
Malaria    -0.043**  -0.060*** 
   [0.017]  [0.020] 
Europe dummies     -0.022 
     [0.023] 
America dummies     -0.023 
     [0.020] 
Asia dummies     -0.031* 
     [0.018] 
Oceania dummies     -0.106** 
     [0.045] 
      
Observations 153  128  128 
R-squared 0.240  0.722  0.753 
RESET [p-value] 0.070  0.769  0.934 
Normality [p-value] 0.895  0.005  0.221 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. RESET is the test for functional form misspecification 
under the null hypothesis that the model is correctly specified. Normality denotes the test for normality 
of the error terms, and the failure to reject the null hypothesis the disturbance terms follow the normal 





Table 2. IV-2SLS estimates 
 
Second-stage estimates  First-stage estimates 




 State history 
State history 
squared 
     
State history -1.190***    
 [0.426]    
State history squared 1.331**    
 [0.585]    
     
Proximity   0.209** 0.073 
   [0.097] [0.067] 
Fitted state history 
squared 




     
     
Baseline controls ✔  ✔ ✔ 
Continent dummies  ✔  ✔ ✔ 









FAR [p-value] 0.031    
Observations 128  128 128 
R-squared 0.635  0.693 0.643 
Notes: Baseline controls are geographic control variables included in Table 1. Continent dummies stand 
for dummy variables for each continent as presented in Table 1. ✔ denotes the inclusion of control 
variables. FAR stands for the fractionally resampled Anderson-Rubin test. The null hypothesis of the 
FAR test is that state history has no statistically significant effect on income inequality, allowing for 
some slight violations of the orthogonality condition. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 




Table 3. Robustness to controlling for historical confounders 
 
Baseline  Adding other measures of early development 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable is disposable income inequality 
       
State history  -0.445***  -0.367*** -0.446*** -0.469*** -0.384*** 
 [0.119]  [0.113] [0.120] [0.126] [0.116] 
State history squared 0.421***  0.381** 0.414*** 0.464*** 0.404*** 
 [0.153]  [0.145] [0.150] [0.164] [0.147] 
Neolithic transition    -0.026*   -0.032** 
   [0.013]   [0.015] 
Neolithic transition squared   0.002*   0.002** 
   [0.001]   [0.001] 
Human settlement duration    0.042  0.067 
    [0.056]  [0.059] 
Human settlement duration 
squared 




Predicted genetic diversity     -0.868 -3.662 
     [3.074] [3.488] 
Predicted genetic diversity squared     0.416 2.388 
     [2.285] [2.595] 
       
Baseline controls ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Continent dummies ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Observations 128  127 128 128 127 
R-squared 0.753  0.765 0.754 0.756 0.776 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to Tables 
1 and 2. 
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Including additional control variables 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable is disposable income inequality 
           
State history -0.445***  -0.333*** -0.436*** -0.394*** -0.394*** -0.457*** -0.445*** -0.405*** -0.379** 
 [0.119]  [0.115] [0.114] [0.110] [0.137] [0.120] [0.120] [0.148] [0.148] 
State history squared 0.421***  0.323** 0.417*** 0.379** 0.358** 0.434*** 0.421*** 0.469** 0.558*** 
 [0.153]  [0.154] [0.151] [0.150] [0.177] [0.154] [0.154] [0.189] [0.198] 
Common law   ✔       ✔ 
Mixed law   ✔       ✔ 
Fractionalization    ✔      ✔ 
Catholics     ✔     ✔ 
Muslims      ✔     ✔ 
Protestants      ✔     ✔ 
Social trust       ✔    ✔ 
Land suitability        ✔   ✔ 
Arable land        ✔   ✔ 
Age dependence ratio        ✔  ✔ 
GDP per capita (log)         ✔ ✔ 
Institutional quality         ✔ ✔ 
Trade openness (log)         ✔ ✔ 
Financial development          ✔ ✔ 
Human capital index         ✔ ✔ 
Baseline controls ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Continent dummies ✔  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
           
Observations 128  126 127 127 79 127 128 109 63 
R-squared 0.753  0.770 0.758 0.768 0.769 0.752 0.753 0.787 0.889 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2. 
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Table 5. Robustness to using different measures of state history 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable is disposable income inequality 
Panel A. Using alternative statehood periods         
State history in 1500CE -0.345***        
 [0.088]        
State history in 1500CE squared 0.339***        
 [0.121]        
Ancestry-adjusted state history  -0.354***       
  [0.091]       
Ancestry-adjusted state history squared  0.337**       
  [0.130]       
         
Panel B. Using alternative discount rates         
State history (0.1% discount)   -0.479***      
   [0.118]      
State history squared (0.1% discount)   0.504***      
   [0.153]      
State history (2% discount)    -0.391***     
    [0.127]     
State history squared (2% discount)    0.318**     
    [0.157]     
State history in 1500CE (0.1% discount)     -0.387***    
     [0.098]    
State history in 1500CE squared (0.1% discount)     0.418***    
     [0.130]    
State history in 1500CE (2% discount)      -0.296***   
      [0.084]   
State history in 1500CE squared (2% discount)      0.250**   
      [0.120]   
Ancestry-adjusted state history (0.1% discount)       -0.391***  
       [0.102]  
Ancestry-adjusted state history squared (0.1% discount)       0.413*** 
[0.139] 
 
Ancestry-adjusted state history (2% discount)        -0.306*** 
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        [0.087] 
Ancestry-Adjusted state history squared (2% discount)        0.247* 
[0.129] 
         
Baseline controls ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Continent dummies ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Observations 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
R-squared 0.745 0.746 0.750 0.752 0.742 0.747 0.741 0.749 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2. 
Table 6. Robustness to colonization and (historical) migration flows 
Restricted samples 
Baseline 
 The fraction of indigenous people (as of 1500)  





 70%  80%  90%  95%   
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
State history  -0.445***  -0.407***  -0.419***  -0.439***  -0.511***  -0.543**  -0.418*** 
 [0.119]  [0.134]  [0.132]  [0.151]  [0.168]  [0.235]  [0.153] 
State history squared  0.421***  0.365**  0.405**  0.377*  0.510**  0.573*  0.374** 
 [0.153]  [0.178]  [0.182]  [0.199]  [0.243]  [0.334]  [0.180] 
              
Baseline controls  ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔ 
Continent dummies ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔  ✔ 
Observations 128  91  84  68  52  54  74 
R-squared 0.753  0.766  0.781  0.810  0.826  0.716  0.568 
Notes: From columns (2) to (5), I restrict the sample size to countries in which the proportion of indigenous people in 1500CE in current population is greater 
than 70%, 80%, 90% and 95%. I also break the sample into former colonies and countries that were colonized in columns (6) and (7), respectively. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See also notes to Tables 1 and 2. 
